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Effective Algorithms to Detect Stepping-Stone Intrusion by
Removing Outliers of Packet RTTs
Lixin Wang , Jianhua Yang, Michael Workman, and Pengjun Wan
Abstract: An effective method to detect stepping-stone intrusion (SSI) is to estimate the length of a connection chain.
This type of detection method is referred to as a network-based detection approach. Existing network-based SSI
detection methods are either ineffective in the context of the Internet because of the presence of outliers in the
packet round-trip times (RTTs) or inefficient, as many packets must be captured and processed. Because of the high
fluctuation caused by the intermediate routers on the Internet, it is unavoidable that the RTTs of the captured packets
contain outlier values. In this paper, we first propose an efficient algorithm to eliminate most of the possible RTT
outliers of the packets captured in the Internet environment. We then develop an efficient SSI detection algorithm by
mining network traffic using an improved version of k-Means clustering. Our proposed detection algorithm for SSI is
accurate, effective, and efficient in the context of the Internet. Well-designed network experiments are conducted in
the Internet environment to verify the effectiveness, correctness, and efficiency of our proposed algorithms. Our
experiments show that the effective rate of our proposed SSI detection algorithm is higher than 85.7% in the context
of the Internet.
Key words: network security; intrusion detection; stepping-stone intrusion; round-trip time; k-Means clustering;
connection chain
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Introduction

Presently, most intruders tend to launch attacks on
a remote target system through compromised hosts
to avoid being detected by security professionals[1–6] .
These compromised hosts are called stepping-stones.
With a Stepping-Stone Intrusion (SSI), an attacker uses
a chain of stepping-stone hosts in the context of the
Internet as relaying machines and remotely logs into
these stepping-stones using command-line tools, such as
SSH. The intruder sends attacking packets to a remote
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target system by relaying via the intermediate steppingstones in the connection chain until the attacking
commands arrive at the potential victim target.
It is well-known that TCP sessions are independent
of one another in a TCP connection between a source
and a destination, even if these sessions are relayed and
belong to the same TCP connection. This nature of the
TCP protocol makes detecting the attacker’s original
geographical location very difficult if SSI is used for an
attack, as the intruder is hidden behind a long interactive
connection chain due to the existence of the intermediate
stepping-stones between the attacker’s machine and the
potential victim host. With SSI, the possibility for a
potential victim host to obtain information about the
origin of the attack is very small.
With SSI, attackers usually create a connection chain
similar to that of Fig. 1 in which the intruder uses
command-line tools, such as SSH, to log in to the
stepping-stones and then launch an attack. In Fig. 1,
Host 0 is assumed to be the attacker’s host that is used
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Fig. 1

A sample connection chain.

to log in to stepping-stone hosts Host 1, Host 2, : : : ,
Host i 1, Host i , Host i C 1, : : : , and Host N 1.
Host N represents the remote target system that is under
attack. To perform SSI detection, any stepping-stone
host (other than the attacker’s host and the target system)
can serve as the sensor machine where a detection
program, such as TCPDump, is installed and used to
capture the packets. In Fig. 1, Host i is assumed to be
the detection sensor machine with a detection program
running. The connection from Host i 1 to Host i is
referred to as an incoming connection to Host i, and the
connection from Host i to Host i C 1 is referred to as
an outgoing connection from Host i. The part of the
connection chain from the attacker’s Host 0 to the sensor
Host i is called the downstream chain, and the part of
the connection chain from the sensor Host i to the target
system Host N is called the upstream chain. If at least
one relayed pair is between all the incoming connections
and all the outgoing connections, then it is most likely
that Host i is being used as a stepping-stone, and the
session is being manipulated by hackers. The purpose
of SSI detection is to determine whether the detecting
sensor Host i is being used as a stepping-stone host by a
hacker.
With host-based SSI detection, the outgoing
connections are compared with the incoming
connections of the same machine, and then the
packets are analyzed to check whether a relayed pair
in the outgoing and incoming connections can be
found. This type of detection method for SSI includes
the known approaches presented in Refs. [1–8]. The
main disadvantage of this type of detection approach
is that it only focuses on a single host, and thus can
easily introduce high false-positive errors because it
is well-known that stepping-stones are actually used
to access remote servers by some legal applications.
Client browsers and Web servers are typical examples
of this type of application to access remote servers.
Another disadvantage of host-based SSI detection is
that it is ineffective when the sessions are manipulated
by intruders using certain hacking techniques, such
as meaningless chaff-packet permutation and/or
time-jittering of changing the timestamps of attacking
packets.
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To overcome the disadvantages of host-based SSI
detection, network-based detection approaches were
proposed for SSI[9–20] . The key idea of this type
of detection method is to estimate the number of
connections from the intruder’s host to the target host
(as shown in Fig. 1), which is referred to as the
length of a (whole) connection chain. If a connection
chain contains three or more connections, then the user
attempts to gain access to a remote target host via three
or most stepping-stones. The more hosts involved in an
interactive session to access a remote server, the slower
the data communication process. Legal applications are
well-known for never using three or more intermediate
hosts to access a remote server. Therefore, if a target
host is accessed via three or more stepping-stones from
another host, then the possibility that the session is
manipulated by a malicious hacker and the target system
is under attacks is very high.
Clearly, false-negative errors could be generated by
using the network-based detection methods. Estimating
the length of the upstream connection is referred to
as upstream detection. Similarly, estimating the length
of the downstream connection chain is referred to as
downstream detection. Upstream detection is performed
with more difficulty and complexity due to the loose
coupling of Send and Echo packets sent from the
intruder’s host. The Send packets captured at the sensor
machine from the upstream connection do not have any
correlation with the Echo packets sent from the attacker
host. Therefore, the length of an upstream connection is
much more difficult to be estimated precisely, which has
been a long-standing open problem for SSI detection. If
no other hosts are between the sensor machine and
the target host, the length of the entire chain is almost
identical to that of the upstream connection. In this case,
all malicious intrusions cannot be detected because of
the false-negative errors caused by the network-based
detection approaches. As the length of an upstream
connection is at least one, as long as the length of the
downstream connection is at least two, the length of the
entire connection chain will be at least three. Therefore, if
the downstream connection contains two connections, then
the target host is probably under attacks, and the session
is being manipulated by intruders. Most network-based
detection algorithms in the literature only considered
the downstream connection. For simplicity, the length
of a connection chain means that the downstream and
the upstream connection parts are always ignored in this
paper, as done in most existing network-based detection
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algorithms.
However, existing network-based detection methods
for SSI are either ineffective in the Internet environment
because of the existence of outlier values in the RTTs
obtained from the captured TCP packets, or they are
inefficient, as many packets must be captured and
processed for these detection approaches. Because of
the high fluctuation caused by the intermediate routers in
the Internet environment, RTTs of the captured packets
with outlier values are unavoidable. In this paper, we
first propose an efficient algorithm to eliminate most
of the possible outliers of the RTTs of the packets
captured in the Internet environment. We then develop
an efficient detection algorithm for SSI by mining
network traffic using an improved version of k-Means
clustering. Our proposed detection algorithm for SSI
is accurate, effective, and efficient in the context of the
Internet. Many well-designed network experiments in
the Internet environment are conducted to verify the
effectiveness, correctness, and efficiency of our proposed
detection algorithm. Our network experiments show that
the effective rate of our proposed detection algorithm for
SSI is higher than 85.7% in the Internet environment.
Next, we give a literature review on SSI detection that
focuses on various network-based detection approaches,
which are more relevant to the work we will present in
this paper. The first proposed detection algorithm via
a network-based approach was presented in Ref. [16]
by Yung in 2002. The key idea used in Ref. [16] was
to calculate the RTT of a Send packet and try to match
this Send with its corresponding ACKnowledgement
(ACK) packet transmitted from the next adjacent host
in the connection chain. The algorithm in Ref. [16]
slightly reduced the false-positive errors. However, this
algorithm for SSI detection generates high false-negative
errors due to the use of the ACK packet from the next
adjacent host, and the actual Echo packet is not used
and analyzed. The problem of the work in Ref. [16] is
that the connection chain was not appropriately set up.
As a result, capturing the actual Echo packets from the
connection chain created in Ref. [16] is impossible.
To overcome the problem caused in the work
in Ref. [16], a step-function detection method was
proposed to estimate the length of a connection chain
in Ref. [17] by Yang and Huang in 2004. Unlike the
detection method developed in Ref. [16], the stepfunction approach developed in Ref. [17] reduced the
false-positive and false-negative errors in the context
of a local area network (LAN). The connection chain

Tsinghua Science and Technology, April 2022, 27(2): 432–442

was properly established in Ref. [17] so that the
corresponding Echo packet of a Send packet can be
captured and analyzed. In Ref. [17], the step-function
approach is used to calculate the packet RTTs by
matching a Send packet with its corresponding Echo
packet. The drawback of the detection method proposed
in Ref. [17] is that it only works well in LANs and
is ineffective in the context of the Internet. The
conservative and greedy packet matching method for SSI
detection proposed by the authors in Ref. [18] worked
well in the Internet environment, but very few TCP
packets can be matched using this detection approach.
As a result, the SSI detection method proposed in Ref.
[18] is ineffective and cannot be used to protect practical
computer networks that are exposed to the Internet.
To the best of our knowledge, the clustering and
partitioning data mining approach presented in Ref. [19]
by Yang and Huang is one of the best-existing
connection-chain-based SSI detection approaches. In
Ref. [19], the packet RTTs are calculated using
the maximum-minimum distance (MMD) clustering
algorithm, and all the possible packets go through during
the process of packet matching, unlike the previously
known methods of matching the Send and Echo packets,
through which Echo and Send packets are compared one
at a time. On the basis of this approach, the number of
clusters produced by the MMD algorithm determines the
number of connections in the chain. Additionally, the
MMD approach proposed in Ref. [19] reduced the falsepositive and false-negative errors significantly. However,
this detection approach for SSI requires that many TCP
packets must be captured and processed. As a result, the
MMD approach proposed in Ref. [19] is inefficient in
terms of packet capturing and the processing time of the
detection algorithm.
To overcome the drawback of the MMD data mining
approach proposed in Ref. [19], a detection algorithm
for SSI using the k-Means clustering approach was
proposed in one of our prior works[20] . This detection
algorithm based on k-Means clustering does not require
many packets to be captured and processed, and thus
it is efficient. Packet RTTs cluster near several levels,
either in LANs or in the Internet environment[17, 19] .
Usually, the k-Means data mining approach is used to put
elements of a dataset into groups of related observations
without prior knowledge of those relationships. As long
as most of the RTT outliers can be removed from the
real RTTs in the input file, the detection algorithm based
on k-Means clustering proposed in Ref. [20] works fine
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in the LAN environment.
Some recent significant research work related to
network security merit acknowledgment. In Ref. [21], a
voting-based deep learning framework was proposed to
detect abnormal network behavior by exploiting any type
of deep learning structure. When several models created
by different aspects of data and various deep learning
structures are considered, this framework provides the
ability to aggregate the best models to produce more
accurate and robust results. Reference [22] proposed
a new approach for intrusion detection by applying
a big databased deep learning system. The authors
of Ref. [22] proposed a big databased hierarchical
deep learning system that uses behavioral features
and content features to understand network traffic
characteristics and information stored in the data payload
to enhance the performance of machine learningbased
intrusion detection systems. Intrusion detection systems
suffer from numerous vulnerabilities during the analysis
and classification of data activities. To overcome this
problem, Ref. [23] developed a new analysis method
and implemented a relevant system to monitor the
circulated traffic. Reference [23] modeled and validated
a heterogeneous traffic classifier that can categorize
collected events within networks. This model is based on
a proposed machine learning algorithm that comprises
an input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer.
Reference [24] investigated how to launch an inference
attack exploiting social networks with a mixture of
non-sensitive attributes and social relationships. In
Ref. [24], this problem is mapped into a collective
classification problem. In the collective inference model
proposed in Ref. [24], an attacker uses user profiles
and social relationships collectively to predict sensitive
information of related victims in a released social
network dataset. Reference [25] proposed an approach
for detecting fake news over online social media via
domain reputations and content understanding. The
authors of Ref. [25] characterized hundreds of popular
fake and real news measured by shares, reactions, and
comments on Facebook from two perspectives: domain
reputations and content understanding. Reference [26]
developed an approach to uploading data in smart cyberphysical systems, in which energy conservation and
privacy preservation are considered. Reference [27]
proposed a privacy-preserved data sharing structure
for the industrial Internet of Things, in which several
competing clients could exist in distinct stages of the
system. Reference [28] developed a mechanism for
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trading range counting results. Under differential privacy,
this mechanism used a sampling method to produce
rough counting results that are theoretically verified to
achieve unbiasedness, bounded variance, and a privacy
guarantee. Reference [29] proposed mechanisms that
enable a comprehensive detection and reconstruction of
attacks. The contributions of Ref. [29] are toward a
better overall detection accuracy at two stages of the
intrusion detection process. First, security monitoring is
enhanced to produce high-quality monitoring data and
to leverage it for an accurate reporting of alerts. Second,
new alert correlation mechanisms identify relations
among the alerts and summarize the reconstructed
attacks. Reference [30] developed a comprehensive
framework to simulate realistic stepping-stone behavior
that includes effective evasion tools and released a large
dataset, which we use to evaluate detection rates for
eight state-of-the-art methods in the literature.
All notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1
for easy referencing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, preliminary knowledge needed to propose the
detection algorithm is presented. An efficient algorithm
is developed in Section 3 to remove the outliers in the
packets RTTs captured in the Internet environment. In
Section 4, we propose an effective algorithm for SSI
detection by mining network traffic using an improved
version of the k-Means clustering method. Performance
analysis of the proposed detection algorithm is provided
in Section 5. Finally, the paper is summarized, and future
research directions are given in Section 6.

2

Preliminary

In this section, we introduce some basic concepts in
computer networks that are required to design our
detection algorithm for SSI and the rationale for using
packet RTTs to estimate the length of a connection chain.
2.1

Definitions of send/echo packets

Let us use Fig. 1 to define Send and Echo packets. Host
Table 1 All notations used in this paper.
Notation
Meaning
X
a random variable

mean of a random variable

standard derivation
k
the number of clusters
ci
the center of the i -th clusters, where i D 1; 2; : : : ; k
C
the set of k centers fc1 ; c2 ; : : : ; ck g
Dataset-j
a dataset of RTT values, where j D 1; 2; or 3
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i is the detecting sensor. In the incoming connection
of Host i , a Send packet is defined as a TCP packet
received at Host i and sent from Host i 1, with the
TCP.Flag.PSH bit set; an Echo packet is defined as a TCP
packet received at Host i 1 and sent from Host i , with
the TCP.Flag.PSH bit set. In the outgoing connection
from Host i , a Send packet is defined as a TCP packet
received at Host i C 1 and sent from Host i , with the
TCP.Flag.PSH bit set; an Echo packet is defined as a
TCP packet received at Host i and sent from Host i C 1,
with the TCP.Flag.PSH bit set.
Now, let us use an example to explain which Send
packet and Echo packet are a matched pair. When a
user types a command on a command line in a Linux
system, such as “ls”, it might be sent to the server in
one or two packets. Suppose that the command “ls” is
sent to the remote server in two separate Send packets:
“l” and “s”. When “l” is typed on the user’s command
line, the packet will be sent to the server-side. Once this
Send packet is echoed, an Echo packet is sent back to
the user’s host, and the letter “l” will be shown on the
terminal of the user’s host. These Send and Echo packets
are called a matched pair. For the letter “s”, a matched
pair can be similarly obtained: a Send “s” and an Echo
“s”. Using the timestamps of a matched pair of Send and
Echo packets, their packet RTT can be easily computed.
The length of the connection time of an interactive TCP
session is represented by the RTT of a matched pair. The
RTT computed from the matched pair of the Send and
Echo packets of “l” is different from the RTT computed
from the matched pair of the Send and Echo packets
of “s”; these two numbers are very close to each other
because these two RTTs stand for the length of the same
connection in different periods. A Send packet could be
echoed by one or more Echo packets. Additionally, an
Echo packet could echo one or more Send packets.
2.2
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connection chain.
Paxson and Floyd[31] found that packet RTTs obtained
from a connection chain obey the Poisson distribution.
This finding can be used to match TCP packets and
further estimate the number of connections in an
extended connection chain. Figure 2 shows a typical
experiment in which packet RTTs obey the Poisson
distribution, where the Y axis represents the probability
of the occurrence of each RTT, and the X -axis represents
the values of the RTTs in microseconds. The values of
the RTTs shown in Fig. 2 were from the packets collected
from a connection chain composed of four connections.
With this experiment, most values of the RTTs are
near the mean  D 138 500 (microsecond) of all the
RTTs, with at least 95% of the RTT values between
137 000 (microsecond) and 141 000 (microsecond) (refer
to Fig. 2).
Assume that a random variable X follows the Poisson
distribution, and its mean and standard deviation are
represented by  and , respectively. Then, we have
jX j 6 2
(1)
On the basis of this inequality, most values of the
random variable X must be near its mean value .
The difference between X and its mean  is upper
bounded by 2 . According to our above discussion, the
packet RTTs obtained from a connection chain follow the
Poisson distribution. In other words, most values of the
packet RTTs obtained from a connection chain of fixed
length must be near its mean within a circle of radius 2.
Therefore, the RTTs corresponding to a connection chain
of fixed length belong to the same cluster, with the mean
 being the cluster center. Thus, if a detection algorithm
can be developed to obtain the number of these data
clusters, then we can easily obtain the matched packets

Distribution of packet RTTs for a connection
chain

A packet RTT of a TCP connection is the sum of
four delays, including the processing delay, queuing
delay, transmission delay, and propagation delay of the
underlying connection. For connection-chain-based SSI
detection, the length of a connection chain is estimated
using the packet RTTs. The RTTs obtained from matched
Send and Echo pairs can be used to represent the network
traffic. Yang and Huang[19] showed that the length of
a connection chain is equal to the number of clusters
that are produced using the RTTs obtained from the

Fig. 2

Distribution of packet RTTs for a connection chain.
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and estimate the length of the connection chain.
Many legitimate applications, such as Web
applications, are well-known for usually using
other servers as stepping-stones to access a remote
server. However, most such legitimate applications never
use three or more hosts as stepping-stones to access
a remote server. Obviously, the more hosts used to
access a remote server, the slower the network traffic. If
there is no intention of hiding malicious activities, then
accessing a remote server via three or more steppingstones is unnecessary, as it could make the performance
of the remote accessing unacceptable. Therefore, a
reasonable assumption is that a host who uses three or
more stepping-stones to access a remote server is highly
suspect as a malicious intruder. This assumption is
popularly used in almost all network-based approaches
for SSI detection in the literature.

3

An Efficient Algorithm for Removing RTT
Outliers

In this section, we present an efficient algorithm for
removing the outliers in the packet RTTs captured in the
Internet environment. Because of the high fluctuation
caused by the intermediate routers on the Internet, outlier
values are unavoidable in the RTTs of the captured
packets. Most of the existing network-based detection
methods for SSI are ineffective because of the presence
of outliers in the packet RTTs captured in the context
of the Internet. The input of this algorithm is a TXT
file with two columns including packet timestamps and
the packet type (either Send or Echo) obtained from the
packets captured in the Internet environment. The output
of this algorithm is a TXT file that contains the packet
RTTs with most of the RTT outlier values removed. The
key idea of this algorithm is that before an RTT value
is added to the file of RTT values, we need to check
whether it is a possible RTT outlier by determining
whether it is tenfold larger than the current average of all
the RTT values that have been added to the file. If it is,
then it is likely to be an outlier RTT value. The algorithm
for removing RTT outliers is described in Algorithm 1.

4

An Effective Detection Algorithm for SSI

In this section, we present an effective algorithm to
detect SSI by mining network traffic using an improved
version of the k-Means clustering approach. Our network
experiment shows that when k D 2 (i.e., all the RTTs
are partitioned into exactly two clusters), our proposed
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Algorithm 1 An efficient algorithm for removing the outliers
of packet RTTs
Input: a TXT file with two columns (including packet
timestamps and the packet type) obtained from the packets
captured in the Internet environment
Output: a TXT file output.txt containing the packet RTTs with
most of the RTT outliers removed
1: for each of the first five Echo packets, compute the time
difference between the Echo packet and its immediate prior
Send packet; write this time difference to the file output.txt
for each of these five Echo packets
2: compute the average of all the RTTs in the file output.txt and
store the value in the variable average
3: for the 6th Echo packet, compute the time differences between
this Echo packet and its prior five Send packets; assume these
Send packets are represented by Send1, Send2, Send3, Send4,
and Send5, respectively
(a) let timediff1 denote the difference between this Echo
packet and Send1. Write timediff1 to the file output.txt if
timediff1 is less than 10  average; recompute the average
of all the RTTs in output.txt and then update the value of
average
/* if the time difference is larger than or equal to tenfold the
average, then the RTT value is most likely an outlier and will
not be written into the output file. Here, the tenfold criterion
is based on observation*/
(b) let timediff2 denote the difference between this Echo
packet and Send2. Perform the same process for timediff2 as
done in the above Step 3(a)
(c) let timediff3 denote the difference between this Echo
packet and Send3. Perform the same process for timediff3 as
done in the above Step 3(a)
(d) let timediff4 denote the difference between this Echo
packet and Send4. Perform the same process for timediff4 as
done in the above Step 3(a)
(e) let timediff5 denote the difference between this Echo
packet and Send5. Perform the same process for timediff5 as
done in the above Step 3(a)
4: repeat Step 3 for each of the remaining Echo packets in the
input file until all the Echo packets are processed

detection algorithm for SSI works effectively, with
an effective rate higher than 85.7% in the Internet
environment. In this paper, the k-Means clustering
approach is only applied when k D 2. The k-Means
clustering approach is neither needed nor used in our
proposed algorithm for other values of k, as it does
not work effectively when k > 2 in the context of the
Internet. The input of our proposed detection algorithm
for SSI in this section is three datasets that were captured
from distinct connection chains with two, three, or
four connections. Our proposed detection algorithm
can effectively output whether a possible intrusion is
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underway in the underlying network.
For the general k-Means clustering method, the main
idea is to find the appropriate k centers, one for each
of the k clusters. The k centers need to be calculated
and then updated in a smart way to minimize the final
standard derivation calculated based on the updated k
centers in the last iteration of the algorithm. Refer
to Ref. [32] regarding the k-Means algorithm and its
implementation. A k-Means clustering algorithm is an
appropriate option for clustering because of the unique
characteristics of TCP packets. Legal applications are
well-known for never using three or more intermediate
hosts to access a remote server. Therefore, if a target
host is accessed via three or more stepping-stones from
another host, then it is highly possible that the session is
being manipulated by a malicious hacker, and the target
system is a potential victim host.
Now, we explain how to use the 2-Means clustering
approach to detect SSI effectively. Consider three RTT
datasets obtained from connection chains of length two,
three, or four in the context of the Internet. We run the 2Means clustering algorithm on these three RTT datasets.
Intuitively, the output generated by the dataset collected
from the connection chain of length two would produce
the smallest standard derivation. On the basis of this
intuition, for these three datasets, we may conclude that
the dataset that produced the output with the smallest
standard derivation was obtained from the connection
chain of length two.
Let P D fp1 ; p2 ; : : : ; pn g be a set of n data points.
Assume that C D fc1 ; c2 ; : : : ; ck g is the set of k centers
that were found by the k-Means clustering algorithm. We
partition P into k disjoint subsets p1 ; p2 ; : : : ; pk ; where
the data points in pj are associated with their nearest
center cj in C for each 1 6 j 6 k by associating each
point in P with the nearest center in C. For each 1 6
j 6 k, let pj D fpj1 ; pj2 ; : : : ; pjjpj j g: The standard
derivation  of the given dataset P based on k-Means
clustering is defined as the square root of its variance as
follows:
v
u
jYj j
u X
k X
u1
 Dt
kyji cj k2
(2)
n
j D1 i D1

Let dataset-1, dataset-2, and dataset-3 denote the three
RTT datasets obtained from three connection chains of
distinct lengths of two, three, or four, respectively. Our
proposed algorithm for SSI detection using the 2-Means
clustering method can accurately determine which
connection chain(s) are sessions possibly manipulated

by malicious hackers. This detection algorithm for SSI
is described in Algorithm 2.
Next, we explain Algorithm 2, which is used to detect
possible SSI. In Step 1, the 2-Means clustering algorithm
is called on dataset-1. The procedure is as follows.
Initially, we randomly select two points in the set P as
the two centers for the clustering algorithm that executes
the steps below:
(1) To generate the two clusters, each point in P
is scanned and assigned to the cluster center whose
distance from the cluster center is the minimum between
both cluster centers;
(2) Calculate the standard derivation curr using the
current partition and cluster centers according to Eq. (2);
(3) For each cluster, recompute the new center, which
is the average of the data points in the cluster;
(4) Use the new cluster centers to reproduce the two
clusters following the same procedure described in the
above Step (1);
(5) Recompute the standard derivation new using the
updated partition and cluster centers according to Eq. (2);
(6) If new > curr ; then Exit; otherwise, repeat
Step (3).
When the 2-Means clustering algorithm exits, the
standard derivation is minimized using the cluster centers
and partition obtained in the last round of the clustering
algorithm. Thus, at the end of the algorithm execution,
the standard derivation can no longer be reduced by
changing the centers of each cluster. According to
Algorithm 2 An effective algorithm for SSI detection
Input: dataset-1, dataset-2, and dataset-3
Output: The connection chain(s) that are sessions possibly
manipulated by malicious hackers
1: call the 2-Means clustering algorithm on dataset-1. Assume1
represents the standard derivation outputted based on Eq. (2)
using the two clusters obtained at the end of the 2-Means
clustering algorithm execution
2: call the 2-Means clustering algorithm on dataset-2. Assume2
represents the standard derivation outputted based on Eq. (2)
using the two clusters obtained at the end of the 2-Means
clustering algorithm execution
3: call the 2-Means clustering algorithm on dataset-3. Assume
3 represents the standard derivation outputted based on
Eq. (2) using the two clusters obtained at the end of the
2-Means clustering algorithm execution
4: if 1 D min f1 ; 2 ; 3 g; dataset-2 and dataset-3 are sessions
possibly manipulated by malicious hackers
5: if 2 D min f1 ; 2 ; 3 g, dataset-1 and dataset-3 are sessions
possibly manipulated by malicious hackers
6: if 3 D min f1 ; 2 ; 3 g, dataset-1 and dataset-2 are sessions
possibly manipulated by malicious hackers
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Eq. (2), the value of 1 is the standard derivation
obtained using the two clusters obtained in the last
iteration of the 2-Means clustering algorithm.
Similarly, the 2-Means clustering algorithm is called
on dataset-2 and dataset-3, respectively, at Steps 2 and 3
of the algorithm. Then, the standard derivations 2 and
3 are in turn calculated.
If 1 is the minimum among the three values 1 ; 2 ;
and 3 ; then dataset-2 and dataset-3 are sessions possibly
manipulated by malicious hackers. Similarly, if 2
is the minimum, then dataset-1 and dataset-3 are
sessions possibly manipulated by malicious hackers.
If 3 is the minimum, then dataset-1 and dataset2 are sessions possibly manipulated by malicious
hackers. Therefore, this algorithm can effectively
determine which connection chain(s) are sessions
possibly manipulated by hackers.

5

Network Experiments and Performance
Analysis of the Proposed Algorithm

In this section, we conduct network experiments in the
Internet environment and analyze the performance of our
proposed algorithms for SSI detection. The window size
we used to generate the RTT datasets in the experiments
is three for all the captured packets. That is, for each
Echo packet, we compute the timestamp differences
between this Echo packet and up to three previous Send
packets. We will verify the effectiveness and correctness
of our proposed detection algorithm for SSI through welldesigned network experiments. In total, we collected
seven datasets, each of which contains three captured
files obtained from connection chains of lengths two,
three, or four. Assume that we do not know the length of
the connection chain where each of these datasets was
collected.
Our network experiments are conducted in the Internet
environment using the virtual machine servers we
created on our Amazon AWS account. To set up the
network experiments, we identified four AWS virtual
servers located in different parts of the world. Our
local MacBook Pro running Ubuntu with IP address:
192.168.1.29 served as the intruder’s host (Fig. 3). Then,
we used SSH to gain remote access to our Mac Mini
Ubuntu desktop as the sensor machine (the first steppingstone S1 in Fig. 3) with IP address 192.168.1.40. The
first AWS Ubuntu server, located in Virginia, USA, with
IP address 34.239.106.90, served as the second stepping-
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Fig. 3 Connection chain of length 4 (from the sensor host S1
to the victim’s host).

stone S 2. The second AWS Ubuntu server, located in
Ireland with IP address 34.243.200.211, served as the
third stepping-stone S 3. The next AWS Ubuntu server,
located in Germany with IP address 18.194.239.70,
served as the fourth stepping-stone S 4. Finally, the
fourth AWS Ubuntu server, located in Mumbai, India,
with IP address 13.233.125.64, served as the victim’s
host (Fig. 3).
We set up the connection chain starting from our
MacBook Pro running Ubuntu as the intruder’s host and
our Mac Mini Ubuntu desktop as the sensor host S1 from
which all the packets are captured using TCPDump. We
used SSH to gain remote access to the second steppingstone S 2. Once we finished with S 2, we then used SSH
to gain remote access to the third stepping-stone S3.
This gave us a total of three hosts and two connections
in the downstream chain starting from the sensor host
S1. Once we finished with S 3, we used SSH to log
into the fourth stepping-stone S 4. This gave us a total
of four hosts and three connections in the downstream
chain. Finally, we used SSH to log in to the victim’s
host located in Mumbai, India. This gave us a total of
five hosts and completed the connection chain with four
connections in the downstream chain from the sensor
host S1 to the victim host. After the connection chains
of lengths two, three, and four were created, we then
used the TCPDump command to capture packets on the
sensor host S1 from each of these connection chains.
See Fig. 3 for the connection chain of four
connections. For the connection chain of two
connections, we monitored and captured its TCP Send
and Echo packets, and then computed the RTTs for
the connection chain. The RTT datasets were generated
using a window of size three. We found that most of
its RTTs are actually near the mean of these RTTs of
the connection chain. Theoretically, this result is true
according to the distribution of the packet RTTs of a
connection chain we discussed in Section 2. Then, we
perform the same procedures for the connection chains
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of three and four connections, respectively. For the
connection chain of length three, most of its RTTs are
indeed near the mean of the RTTs of the connection
chain. The same is true for the connection chain with
length four. Let dataset-1, dataset-2, and dataset-3
represent the datasets of packet RTTs generated from
the captured TCP Send and echo packets collected from
the connection chains of lengths 2, 3, and 4, respectively,
using a window of size three.
Then, we run the 2-Means clustering algorithm (i.e.,
all the elements in the dataset are divided into exactly
two clusters) on dataset-1, dataset-2, and dataset-3. For
each input dataset, this 2-Means clustering algorithm
outputs the standard derivation calculated using the two
clusters obtained at the last iteration of the 2-Means
clustering based on Eq. (2). The standard derivations
outputted by this clustering algorithm are listed in
Table 2. Based on the data shown in Table 2, the RTT
dataset we collected from the connection chain of length
two achieves the smallest standard derivation on six of
the seven datasets we captured (only the output generated
on dataset-2 is incorrect). This result means that our
proposed detection algorithm for SSI generates correct
output on six of the seven datasets. Therefore, this
network experiment shows that the effective rate of our
proposed detection algorithm for SSI is 6=7  85.7% in
the Internet environment.

6

Conclusion
Directions

and

Future

Research

In this paper, we first developed an efficient algorithm to
remove most of the outliers in the packet RTTs obtained
from packets captured in the Internet environment.
Table 2 Standard derivations outputted by the 2-Means
clustering algorithm (k = 2) on the seven captured datasets.
Standard derivation
Dataset
2 connections 3 connections 4 connections
Dataset-1
3184.3
11 785.8
17 431.3
Dataset-2
20 645.9
2146.2
1542.9
Dataset-3
2138.0
16 407.4
5326.3
Dataset-4
20 744.7
27 048.5
74 598.9
Dataset-5
22 709.1
26 717.7
163 099.7
Dataset-6
25 121.4
26 071.2
85 997.0
Dataset-7
23 549.5
25 468.2
84 584.2
Note: Each dataset contains three captured files of RTTs collected
from downstream connection chains with 2, 3, or 4 connections,
respectively. The RTT dataset we collected from the connection
chain of length 2 achieves the smallest standard derivation on six
of the seven datasets we captured (only the output generated on
dataset-2 is incorrect and in bold face).

Because of the accumulated data communication delay
at the intermediate routers on the Internet, the RTTs
obtained from the captured TCP packets usually have
outlier values in the context of the Internet. This result
makes most of the known network-based detection
methods for SSI ineffective in the Internet environment.
We then proposed an effective SSI detection algorithm
by mining network traffic using an improved version
of the k-Means clustering algorithm. With most of
the RTT outliers removed, both proposed algorithms
work together and make our detection method for SSI
developed in this paper more effective and efficient
than the existing network-based detection approaches in
the literature. We also conducted several well-designed
network experiments in the context of the Internet to
verify the effectiveness, correctness, and efficiency of
the proposed SSI detection algorithm.
For future research in this direction, we plan to
improve our SSI detection algorithms so that they
will resist session manipulation by intruders using
hacking tools, such as time-jittering and/or meaningless
chaff perturbation, in the Internet environment. The
work presented in this paper may also be extended by
improving the proposed algorithm to remove the packet
RTT outliers so that the effective rate of the detection
algorithm for SSI can be increased in the context of the
Internet.
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